Yasir Ali ; Asma Javaid - Pairwise Stability in Two Sided Market with Strictly Increasing Valuation Functions

dmtcs:1415 - Discrete Mathematics & Theoretical Computer Science, April 12, 2017, Vol. 19 no. 1 - https://doi.org/10.23638/DMTCS-19-1-10
Pairwise Stability in Two Sided Market with Strictly Increasing Valuation FunctionsArticle

Authors: Yasir Ali ; Asma Javaid

    This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an indivisible goods that buyers own. Valuation functions, for participants of both sides, are represented by strictly increasing functions with money considered as discrete variable. An algorithm is devised to prove the existence of stability for this model.


    Volume: Vol. 19 no. 1
    Section: Discrete Algorithms
    Published on: April 12, 2017
    Accepted on: December 16, 2016
    Submitted on: April 7, 2017
    Keywords: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory,Mathematics - Combinatorics

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