Stéphane Le Roux - Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order

dmtcs:3468 - Discrete Mathematics & Theoretical Computer Science, January 1, 2005, DMTCS Proceedings vol. AF, Computational Logic and Applications (CLA '05) - https://doi.org/10.46298/dmtcs.3468
Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial OrderArticle

Authors: Stéphane Le Roux 1,2

  • 1 Laboratoire de l'Informatique du Parallélisme
  • 2 Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

In sequential games of traditional game theory, backward induction guarantees existence of Nash equilibrium by yielding a sub-game perfect equilibrium. But if payoffs range over a partially ordered set instead of the reals, then the backward induction predicate does no longer imply the Nash equilibrium predicate. Non-determinism is a solution: a suitable non-deterministic backward induction function returns a non-deterministic strategy profile which is a non-deterministic Nash equilibrium. The main notions and results in this article are constructive, conceptually simple and formalised in the proof assistant Coq.


Volume: DMTCS Proceedings vol. AF, Computational Logic and Applications (CLA '05)
Section: Proceedings
Published on: January 1, 2005
Imported on: May 10, 2017
Keywords: partial order,non-determinism,sequential game,Nash equilibrium,constructive,proof assistant,[INFO.INFO-LO] Computer Science [cs]/Logic in Computer Science [cs.LO],[INFO.INFO-SC] Computer Science [cs]/Symbolic Computation [cs.SC]

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